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Fair Use or Foul Play?
The EC Directive on the Legal Protection
of Computer Programs and Its Impact on
Reverse Engineering
I. Introduction
In the face of a worldwide recession the software industry
continues to show healthy growth.' The greatest percentage of
this growth is taking place in Europe. 2 The European Economic
Community ("EEC" or "EC") comprised of over 350 million Eu-
ropean consumers 3 is, thus, a fertile market for commercial ex-
ploitation of computer software. In recognition of the
proliferation of software into its member states, the EC has re-
cently adopted the Council Directive4 on the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs ("Directive"). 5 The Directive was drafted
1. See, e.g., Steven Burke, International Sales a Major Factor in Novell's 71%
.Earnings Increase, PC WEEK, Mar. 9, 1992, at 157; Pierre A. Conseil, Software
More Promising Than Computer Services in Europe of the 1990's, COMPUTERGRAM
INT'L, June 16, 1992, at CG106160022.
2. Conseil, supra note 1, at CGI06160022 (projecting growth rates of approxi-
mately 20% through 1995).
3. Carl T. Hall, The Pact Nobody Understands, North American Free Trade
Agreement Puzzles Most, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 7, 1993, at B1.
4. Directives are legally binding acts of the EC as to the results they seek to
achieve. PENELOPE KENT, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW -(THE M+E HANDBOOK SE-
RIES) 24 (1992). They allow member states a measure of discretion as to the means
of implementation, legislation or legislative action. They are the primary means
that the EC uses to harmonize the states' laws. See id. at 25. The EC has four
major sources of law: (1) the treaties creating the institution; (2) subsidiary trea-
ties, called primary legislation; (3) secondary legislation, including regulations, di-
rectives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions; and (4) decisions of the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ"). Id. at 23.
5. Council Directive 91/250 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs,




with an eye towards the expanding European software market,
with the understanding that computer programs are not pro-
tected in all of the member states, and that such protection
where it exists, has different attributes.6 The Directive is an
ambitious piece of legislation. It attempts to impart a specific-
ity to copyright protection for computer programs that is absent
in its United States and Japanese counterparts.7 Some com-
mentators applaud these efforts.8 Critics, however, while ac-
knowledging the magnitude of the undertaking, fear that the
Directive may further obfuscate this complex area of copyright
law.9 They worry that in its zeal to encourage competition and
remove barriers to free trade, the EC may have ignored the his-
torical underpinnings of copyright law, and the practical reali-
ties of the software industry.10
The legal protection of computer programs has been a
troublesome issue since the infancy of the industry." The
United States, and most of the member states of the EC, 12 have
chosen copyright law as the means to protect computer pro-
grams.13 This has created problems, as copyright protection ex-
tends to the particular expression of an idea, and not the idea
itself.14 Application of copyright law to computer programs has
raised questions regarding which elements of a computer pro-
6. See id.
7. See Alan K. Palmer & Thomas C. Vinje, The EC Directive On The Legal
Protection Of Computer Software: New Law Governing Software Development, 2
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 65 (1992).
8. See James R. Wamot, Jr., Software Copyright Protection In The European
Community: Existing Law And An Analysis Of The Proposed Council Directive, 6
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 355, 376 (1991) (inconsistencies with
multinational conventions concerning copyright protection can be reconciled, and
the Directive is a workable step toward providing consistent software protection in
the EC).
9. See, e.g., Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7, at 86-87; Mindy Weichselbaum,
Comment, The EEC Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs and
U.S. Copyright Law: Should Copyright Law Permit Reverse Engineering of Com-
puter Programs?, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1027, 1061-68 (1990-1991).
10. See Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7, at 86-87.
11. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 1 1.01
(Supp. 1991).
12. See infra part III on the member states protection of computer programs.
13. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-117 (1988).
14. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED
STATE DOCTRINES 558 (3d ed. 1990); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667.
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gram are ideas, and which are the expressive components of the
underlying idea.' 5 The extent to which the instructions that
comprise the computer program are protected is of vital impor-
tance in determining the degree of reverse engineering that will
be permitted under copyright law.' 6 If one takes the position
that a program's code is an expression, distinct from the pro-
gram's underlying idea, then decompilationl' cannot be permit-
ted under copyright law.'8 Computer programs are especially
vulnerable to piracy because they are expensive to develop and
inexpensive to copy.' 9 The Directive, while acknowledging this
susceptibility, permits reverse engineering of computer pro-
grams with certain limitations. 20
Section II of this Comment will examine how the Directive
was adopted. Section III will examine the laws of some of the
member states, and the steps that must be taken by these
states to comply with the Directive. Section IV will compare the
Directive with the Berne Convention, a longstanding multilat-
eral copyright convention. In Section V, a comparison of the
15. See, e.g., Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). A computer program may be
loosely defined as a detailed series of instructions that, when executed by a com-
puter, bring about a desired result. See 17 U.S.C § 101 (1988). Computer pro-
grams are initially written in human-readable form (high-level programming
languages) called source code, and then are converted through a program called a
compiler to object code. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 1.03[2]. Object code is essen-
tially a string of 1's and O's that are read as on/off signals for the electronic compo-
nents in the computer. Id. Object code is thus read by the computer, but would be
indecipherable to the user of the program. See GOLDsTEIN, supra note 14, at 823.
16. See Weichselbaum, supra note 9, at 1035-39. Reverse engineering in the
context of computer programs refers to the creation of a new program based on
information obtained from the original. Id. at 1037. Reverse engineering of com-
puter programs may be roughly divided into two categories: black box analysis and
decompilation. Warnot, supra note 8, at 78-84. Black box analysis involves sub-
jecting a program to certain input conditions, and monitoring its output in an at-
tempt to better understand its function. Id. at 78-80. Decompilation on the other
hand is a much more intrusive act, involving the conversion of the machine-reada-
ble object code back to source code. Id. at 80-84.
17. See supra note 16.
18. See 7 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
19. Directive, supra note 5, at 42. "Whereas the development of computer pro-
grams requires the investment of considerable human, technical and financial re-
sources ... computer programs can be copied at a fraction of the cost needed to
develop them independently." Id.
20. Id. art. 5-6, at 44-45. The Directive contains allowances for both types of
reverse engineering. Black box analysis is permitted without restriction. Decom-
pilation is permitted only in certain instances. Id.
3
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United States copyright law, as it applies to computer software,
will lend insight into the relative differences in the respective
markets. Finally, Section VI will focus on the potential impact
the Directive will have on the growing European software
industry.
II. The Directive
In June of 1988, the Commission 2' issued a Green Paper on
Copyright and the Challenges of Technology.22 The Green Pa-
per discussed current European copyright law, and other alter-
natives for protecting computer programs. 23 The Green Paper
requested comments on a myriad of topics involving the legal
protection of computer programs. 24
After considering numerous commentaries, the Commis-
sion issued a proposal for a Directive ("Proposal"). 25 The funda-
21. The legislative bodies of the EC are: the Commission, the European Par-
liament ("Parliament"), and the Council of Ministers ("Council"). See KENT, supra
note 4, at 10-18. The Commission is a seventeen member body with representa-
tives from each member state. It is divided into Directorates General ("DG") of
varying size, which individually cover matters concerning the EC, such as external
relations and competition. Id. at 16. The Commission initiates EC action by sub-
mitting proposals to the Council. Id. at 17. The Council is comprised of represent-
atives from the member states who are responsible for voting on legislation
proposed by the Commission. Id. at 14. The Parliament is comprised of 519 Mem-
bers of European Parliament ("MEP") that are directly elected by the populations
of all of the member states. Id. at 11. Their role in the passage of EC legislation is
one of consultation with the Commission and Council. Id.
22. Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7, at 67. A green paper is a working document
drafted by the Commission addressing and seeking commentary on a substantive
issue of a proposed directive. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 67-68. The Green Paper discussed, inter alia, whether protection
should be granted via copyright law or some other method, whether protection
should apply to programs fixed in any form, whether reproduction should not be
permitted without the approval of the right-holder, whether adaptation by a licen-
see for personal use within the basic scope of the license should be permitted, and
what the term of this protection should be. See Green Paper on Copyright and the
Challenges of Technology: Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action,
COM(88)172 final at 186-94.
25. See Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7, at 67-68; see also Commission Proposal
for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1989 O.J.
(C91) 4 [hereinafter Proposal]. A proposal is part of the EC's legislative procedure
for the passage of a directive. See KENT, supra note 4, at 20. Under the coopera-
tion procedure, the Commission drafts a proposal, which is sent to the Council for
deliberation, and the Parliament for its first reading. Id. The Council then adopts
a common position by a qualified majority of its members. Within three months,
1006
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mental thrust of the Proposal was that computer programs
were to be protected under copyright law as literary works.26
The Proposal detailed, inter alia, those who would benefit from
the protection, acts requiring the authorization of the copyright
holder, exceptions to these restrictions, and the terms of the
protection.27
Article 4 of the Proposal enumerated certain restricted acts
which required the authorization of the right-holder. 28 Under
Article 4, the reproduction of any part of a program, whether
done in the course of running, viewing, transmitting, or storing,
was to be restricted; any adaptation of the program was re-
stricted as well.29 Notably, the Proposal was silent on reverse
engineering. However, since decompilation requires loading the
program into memory, it was presumably restricted under the
Proposal.30
A. The Reverse Engineering Debate
1. The ECIS Arguments
The Proposal ignited a powder keg of debate, and set the
stage for lobbying on a scale rarely seen before in the branches
upon a second reading, the Parliament will either approve or reject the Council
opinion. Id. If the Parliament approves, the Council may adopt the act; if they
reject, the Council may adopt the act only upon a unanimous vote. Id. If the Par-
liament amends the draft, the Commission may revise its proposal. Id. Within
three months of this amendment, the Council must either adopt the amended pro-
posal by qualified majority, adopt Parliamentary amendments that were not incor-
porated into the proposal, or otherwise amend the proposal by unanimous vote. Id.
If the council fails to act, the Commission proposal lapses. Id.
26. See Proposal, supra note 25, at 6. The Proposal was drafted by the Direc-
torate General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs (DG-III) with help from
the Director General for Competition (DG-IV) and for Telecommunications, Infor-
mation, Industries, and Innovation (DG-XIII). See Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7,
at 68. The Proposal was drafted so that its terms would coincide with the protec-
tion afforded under the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion. See Proposal, supra note 25, at 7. It rejected the notion of sui generis
legislation in the field of computer programs because of the advantages that inure
to conformance with these longstanding conventions. Id.; see infra part IV for a
discussion of these multinational conventions.
27. Proposal, supra note 25, arts. 1-7, at 9-12.
28. Id. art. 4, at 10-11. Restricted acts included the reproduction, translation
or adaptation of the code. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7, at 70.
5
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of the EC.3 Small and mid-sized software companies, fearing
that the implied restrictions on reverse engineering would place
them at a competitive disadvantage compared to larger compa-
nies, banded together in an alliance called the European Com-
mittee for Interoperable Systems ("ECIS"). 32 ECIS maintained
that reverse engineering, including decompilation, was a legiti-
mate means of competition used throughout the world.3 3 ECIS
claimed that such a prohibition of decompilation would inter-
fere with the creation of interoperable programs.3 4 Such inter-
ference, it claimed, would serve to insulate the larger software
concerns from competition from small and medium sized Euro-
pean software companies.3 5
2. The SAGE Arguments
In response to these arguments, representatives from the
larger software manufacturers formed a lobbying group called
the Software Alliance Groups for Europe ("SAGE"). 36 SAGE
countered the arguments of ECIS by claiming that the term re-
verse engineering, as applied to decompilation, is misleading, as
decompilation, by its nature, necessarily requires unauthorized
copying, whereas, in other contexts, reverse engineering is ac-
31. See Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7, at 71-73.
32. See EC: Violent Emotions Surge in Brussels over the Impending Changes
to Software Copyright Laws, COMPUTER WKLY., July 19, 1990, at 16 [hereinafter
Violent Emotions]. Membership in ECIS included companies such as Bull and
Olivetti, among others. Id.
33. See Copyright: Debate over Scope of Computer Software Protection, EUR.
REP., Jan. 27, 1990, at 6. ECIS claimed that reverse analysis is generally used for
the purposes of analysis and innovation, and that it is mainly used in the open-
systems and systems integration sectors. Id. If companies could no longer rely on
these techniques, ECIS asserted that U.S. monopolies in the proprietary systems
sector, such as IBM and DEC, would be reinforced. Id.
34. See Violent Emotions, supra note 32, at 19. The term interoperable has
been defined as the ability for two programs to work together, implying accurate
knowledge of all hardware, and software interface protocols. See Andrew Johnson-
Laird, Reverse Engineering of Software: Separating Legal Mythology from Actual
Technology, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 340 (1992). As interpreted by the ECIS advocates,
this interoperability included the interaction or similar function of two programs.
See Violent Emotions, supra note 32, at 19.
35. See Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7, at 68-71.
36. See EC: IBM and DEC Turn Up Piracy Pressure to Get Amendments to
Software Copyright Law Dropped, COMPUTER WKLY., Jan. 4, 1990, at 72. SAGE
membership included larger computer concerns such as IBM, DEC, Apple, and
Microsoft. See Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7, at 70-71.
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complished by a mere physical dismantling of the original pro-
tected item.3 7 SAGE argued that it is in the financial interests
of larger manufacturers to provide access to the relevant por-
tions of their programs needed to design interoperable pro-
grams, and that licensing agreements between the
manufacturer and these other parties could adequately control
the communication of the information needed to create these
programs.38 Absent this limited access, SAGE argued, un-
restricted decompilation would dissuade companies from invest-
ing resources into the development of software products that
were vulnerable to piracy.39 Finally, SAGE lobbyists asserted
that the fears of monopolistic closed systems were misplaced be-
cause EC competition law will prevent dominant manufacturers
from forming such monopolies. 40
B. The Amended Proposal and the Resultant Directive
The impact of this lobbying created divided opinions within
the three legislative branches of the EC.41 The Legal Affairs
37. See Violent Emotions, supra note 32, at 17.
38. IBM Europe, Comments On The Debate Over "Reverse Engineering" of
Software 8 (Oct. 1989) (unpublished comment on file with the Pace Law Review)
[hereinafter Comments on the Debate]. When third party development of attach-
ing programs is permitted, the original program expands its function, and is thus
rendered more attractive to the potential consumer. Id. Additionally, refusal to
provide such information is contrary to other EC competition legislation. Thus,
some SAGE advocates hold that interoperability arguments are redundant. Vio-
lent Emotions, supra note 32, at 18.
39. See Copyright: Battle Rages on Software Protection Directive, MULTINAT'L
SERVICE, Feb. 1990, at 11. They further argued that the notion of reverse engi-
neering a literary work is nonsensical, and that the expression of a computer pro-
gram is complete in its object code, as would be the expression of a novel in its text.
Comments on the Debate, supra note 38, at 8. Another tenet of the SAGE argu-
ment was that authorizing decompilation will shorten the time it takes competi-
tor's products to get to market. Id. The profit reaped during this curtailed "lead
time" would thus be severely reduced, and the developer would be forced to com-
pete against an adaptation of his own work, thereby further reducing the develop-
ment incentive. Id.
40. Violent Emotions, supra note 32, at 18.
41. See Intellectual Property: Commission Tables Amended Directive on
Software Protection, MULTINAT'L SERVICE, Oct. 1990, at 15; see also Palmer &
Vinje, supra note 7, at 72. Directorate-General III, the original drafters, sided
with the SAGE arguments for strong protection. Id. DG's IV and XIII seemed
more amenable to the ECIS arguments. Id. Lobbying efforts in Brussels created a
similar split in the Parliament. Id. at 73; see supra note 21 for discussion of the




Commission of the Parliament submitted an opinion to the
Commission that included amendments favorable to reverse en-
gineering.42 The Commission responded in the fall of 1990 by
drafting a modified proposal ("Amended Proposal"). 43 The
Amended Proposal included provisions for reverse engineering,
creating a limited exception for copying, and adapting code for
the design of interoperable programs.44 Article 5 of the
Amended Proposal allowed the user to perform black box analy-
sis on a program.45 Article 5a allowed for reproduction of the
code and translation of its form (or decompilation), where neces-
sary, to achieve the creation or maintenance of an indepen-
dently created interoperable program. 46 The Amended Proposal
permitted this act on the condition that the decompilation was
used solely to achieve interoperability and was limited to those
portions of the program needed to achieve interoperability. 47 It
provided that the information was not to be given to others un-
less it related to the creation of the independent program, and
that the resultant product was not to be substantially similar to
the expression of the original program.48 Finally, the Amended
Proposal cautioned that these allowances could not be inter-
preted to permit acts which conflict with the right-holders nor-
mal exploitation of the program.49
Following the Commission's publication, a new debate
arose regarding whether the exception for interoperability
would apply only to independently created programs that would
interface with or attach to the original program, or whether it
would be extended to permit the use of decompilation to create
programs that serve the same function as the original (i.e. com-
42. See Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7, at 75.
43. Id. at 76.
44. See Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 1990 O.J. (C 320) 22. The Amended Proposal defined inter-
operability as the functional interconnection and interaction of programs. Id. at
23.
45. Id. art. 5, at 27.
46. Id. art. 5a, at 28.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. art. 5a(3) at 28. Section 3 of Article 5a claims to bring the provision
under the control of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-
tic Works. Id.; see also infra part IV for a discussion of the Berne Convention.
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peting programs).50 A proposal backed by the United Kingdom
would have limited the act of decompilation to the creation of
"connecting-products". 51 This proposal was defeated amidst
heavy lobbying by both sides.5 2 By year end, the Council had
voted to adopt a uniform position ("Common Position") on the
draft, which replaced the United Kingdom's proposal with a
provision that would allow decompilation to achieve interoper-
ability regardless of whether the new product connected to the
original or not.53 The Common Position was forwarded to the
Parliament for a second reading, along with a communication
from the Commission explaining how the opinion of the Legal
Affairs Committee had been incorporated into the Directive. 54
The communication detailed the decompilation allowances of
the Directive, but cautioned that it would not permit the repro-
duction of parts of the original program's code for uses other
than achieving interoperability. 55 Parliament acquiesced in the
Council's Common Position, and the Council finally adopted the
Directive, with the full support of the Commission, on May 14,
1991.56
As adopted, the Directive recognizes computer programs as
literary works subject to copyright protection under the Berne
Convention. 57 No originality requirement is applied other than
that the work is the author's own intellectual creation. 58 Under
Article 4, the author is granted the exclusive right to authorize
50. See Karl Schneider, EC: Storm Rages Over Britain's Proposal to Ban Re-
verse Engineering, ELECTRONICS WKLY., Nov. 28, 1990, at 15.
51. Id.
52. See Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7, at 77.
53. Id.
54. Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, ER.
PARL. Doc. (SEC 87 final-SYN 183) 5 (1991). The communication stated that
decompilation is to be permitted to the extent necessary to ensure the interoper-
ability of an independently created program. Id. "Such a program may connect to
the program subject to decompilation. Alternatively it may compete with the
decompiled program and in such cases will not normally connect to it." Id. (empha-
sis added).
55. Id.
56. See Directive, supra note 5, at 42.
57. Id.; see infra part IV for a discussion of the Berne Convention.
58. Directive, supra note 5, art. 1(3), at 44. "A computer program shall be
protected if it is original in the sense that it is the author's own intellectual crea-





restricted acts such as reproduction, translation, adaptation, ar-
rangement, or any other alteration of a computer program, as
well as the distribution of the program.59 Article 5 provides for
exceptions to these restricted acts.60 Thus, to the extent that
the restrictions of Article 4 prevent the normal use of the com-
puter program, they do not apply.61 The making of back-up
copies of the program is likewise permitted under Article 5.62
Reverse engineering, including observing, testing, or studying
the function of the program in order to determine the underly-
ing principles thereof (i.e. black box analysis), may be conducted
without the authorization of the right-holder.6 3 However, under
Article 6, decompilation is permitted only by the licensee or his
agents where such reproduction of the code is indispensable to
obtaining the information needed to create an independent in-
teroperable program, and such information is not otherwise
readily available.6 4 In attempting to achieve compatibility with
the Berne Convention, Article 6 states that the results of such
decompilation may not be used to conflict with the normal ex-
ploitation of the program by the right-holder.65 Finally, the Di-
rective states that any contractual provision that disallows
reverse engineering, as authorized under Articles 5 and 6, is
null and void.66
Member states were instructed to adopt such provisions
necessary to comply with the terms of the Directive by January
1, 1993.67 The Directive is unclear on certain points, and this
59. Id. art. 4, at 44.
60. Id. art. 5, at 44.
61. Id. art. 5(1), at 44.
62. Id. art. 5(2), at 44.
63. Id. art. 5(3), at 45. This analysis is permissible if done while performing
any of the acts of loading, displaying, running, transmitting or storing the pro-
gram. Id.
64. Id. art. 6(1), at 45. Decompilation is to be limited to the portions of the
program needed to obtain interoperability, and the results may neither be used or
distributed to others for purposes other than the creation of interoperable pro-
grams. Id. art. 6(1), 6(2), at 45. Such resultant programs may not be substantially
similar in expression to the original program. Id. art. 6(2)(c), at 45. Thus,
although they may compete with each other and perform the same function, the
expressive portions of the programs cannot be substantially similar.
65. Id. art. 6(3), at 45.
66. Id. art. 9(1), at 45.
67. Id. art. 10(1), at 46.
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ambiguity has worried both ECIS and SAGE lobbyists. 68 First,
the Directive ambiguously defines the term "interoperable".6 9
Despite this, interoperability is the threshold criterion for de-
termining whether the act of decompilation is to be sanc-
tioned.70 Second, the Directive states that decompilation is to
be limited to those portions of the program needed to achieve
interoperability.7'1 Even if one were to ignore the ambiguity
concerns, it is unclear how this provision is to be enforced.
Practically speaking, it is nearly impossible for one to know
which portion of the object code contains the "interoperable" in-
formation.7 2 Finally, the Directive concludes that such an al-
lowance of decompilation will not be read to permit
unreasonable interference with the right-holder's normal ex-
ploitation of the computer program.7 3 Yet, as stated above, the
Commission has defined interoperability to include the creation
of competing programs.7 4 These two positions seem at odds
with each other.
III. Laws of the Member States
The twelve member states of the EC provide varying de-
grees of protection for computer programs.7 5 Some states such
as Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal have neither
statutory provisions nor case law regarding the protection of
computer programs.7 6 Other states, such as the Netherlands,
have stayed the enactment of national laws regarding the pro-
tection of computer programs pending the passage of the Direc-
tive.77 The states that have developed national legislation
68. See Software Argument Left Unresolved by European Commission on
Software Copyright, INFoMATics, May 15, 1991, at 13.
69. See Directive, supra note 5, at 43. Interoperability may be defined as "the
ability to exchange information and mutually to use the information which has
been exchanged." Id.
70. Id. art. 6(1), at 45.
71. Id. art. 6(1)(c), at 45.
72. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 34, at 345.
73. Directive, supra note 5, art. 6(3), at 45.
74. See Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7, at 77.
75. Directive, supra note 5, at 42. Member states of the EC include Germany,
France, Spain, Italy, U.K., Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and Denmark; See KENT, supra note 4, at 6-8.
76. See Warnot, supra note 8, at 363.




regarding software protection were instructed to adapt this leg-
islation to conform with the provisions of the Directive by Janu-
ary 1, 1993.78 France, Germany, the United Kingdom and
Spain have the most extensively developed legislation regard-
ing the protection of computer programs, and thus, are facing
the difficult task of harmonizing their software protection laws
with the Directive.7 9
Inability to achieve conformity with the Directive may re-
sult in proceedings before the European Court of Justice
("ECJ").80 In the event of a conflict between the Directive and a
domestic law, the question of priority depends to some extent,
on the member state's approach to incorporating international
treaties into national law.8' There are two main approaches:
the monistic approach holds that the international obligation
takes effect as soon as the treaty has been ratified;8 2 the dual-
istic approach holds that an international obligation does not
take effect until it has been incorporated into domestic stat-
utes.83 Additionally, the constitutions of the respective states
control the determination of the supremacy of EC law. 4 Thus,
those states that must endeavor to harmonize their domestic
laws with the Directive or risk censure are confronted with a
78. Directive, supra note 5, art. 10(1), at 46.
79. See Warnot, supra note 8, at 363-68.
80. See KENT, supra note 4, at 30-31. Article 189 of the EEC Treaty holds that
directives are binding the result to be achieved, but allows the states discretion as
to how to achieve these results. Id. at 30. Conflict over the relationship between
EC law and the laws of the member states as it relates to directives, is a vexing
issue. The controversy stems from the extent to which directives are to be held
directly effective (i.e. the extent to which they give rise to rights or obligations
upon which individuals may rely before national courts). Id. at 31-32. While direc-
tives are unquestionably vertically directly effective (i.e. provisions may be en-
forced against states), debate continues regarding the extent to which the
enforcement of a directive may fall on an individual (i.e. horizontal direct effect).
Id.
81. Id. at 37.
82. Id. The Netherlands, for example, adopts this approach. Id.
83. Id. The U.K., Italy, and Germany follow this dualistic approach. Id.
84. Id. The ECJ has endeavored in several of its holdings to set forth harmo-
nizing criteria, which would establish a new legal order in which the member
states have limited their sovereignty within certain fields, in order to partake of its
benefits. Id. at 39. Principles of this new order include the limitation of sovereign
rights in areas covered by the EEC Treaty, and a restriction on national courts
from applying domestic law in such areas of conflict. Id. at 39-41.
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task whose magnitude depends on the conformity of their pres-
ent domestic law with the terms of the Directive.8 5
A. France
In 1985, the French Senate adopted law no. 85-660, which
amended the Copyright Act of 1957 to specifically include com-
puter programs ("les logiciels") among the categories of copy-
righted works.8 6 The 1985 law does not put forth an originality
requirement for copyright protection, but it is arguably covered
under a general provision of the 1957 act requiring that the title
of an intellectual work be protected where it is of an original
character. 87 The 1985 law restricts the unauthorized copying of
a computer program other than for the making of back-up cop-
ies. 88 However, it also provides that the author cannot restrict
a licensee from adapting the program to meet its needs.8 9 As
worded, this limited allowance for adaptation does not contem-
plate decompilation. 90 In its decisions following the 1985 act,
the French Supreme Court has held that a computer program
must embody an intellectual contribution by the programmer to
merit copyright protection.91
French courts have been reluctant to recognize the
supremacy of EC law.92 However, under the Directive, France
will need to amend its domestic laws to allow users to perform
reverse engineering in some situations, which will mean an ex-
pansion of the reproduction and adaptation provisions of the ex-
isting law. 93
85. See id. at 37-41.
86. Copyright Act of 1957, Law No. 57-298, J.O. 4143, (Fr.) as amended by
art. 1-V, Law No. 85-660, J.O. 7495, translated in U.N. EDuc., SCIENTIFIC AND CUL-
TURAL ORG. ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1992).
87. See id. art. 5.
88. CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE EUROPEAN SoFTWARE DIRECTIVE 20 (1991) (refer-
ring to Law No. 85-660 and its restrictions on reproduction).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Warnot, supra note 8, at 365 (discussing implications of Judg-
ment of Mar. 7, 1986 (Atari, Inc.), Cass. ass. pldn., 1986 Bull. Civ. I, No. 1, at 7
(Fr.)).
92. KENT, supra note 4, at 46. Actually the Cour de Cassation (the highest
court of appeal) has been more favorable to EC law than the Conseil d'Etat (the
supreme administrative court). See id.





The German Copyright Act of 1965, like its French counter-
part, was amended in 1985 to include computer programs as
literary works subject to copyright protection.94 Since the Act
contains no explicit originality requirement for copyright pro-
tection of computer programs, the task of setting this standard
has been the province of the German courts. 95 The decision of
the Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court) in Suedwestdeutsche
Inkasso KG v. Bappart & Burker Computer GmBH,9 6 ("In-
kasso") required that the threshold of originality to be met by a
copyrightable program was that it represent a creative effort,
and the skills needed to develop it exceeded those of an average
programmer. 97 This standard made it very difficult to deter-
mine whether a work in development would be granted copy-
right protection.98 Opinions following the Inkasso decision have
softened this originality requirement to a demonstration of an
intellectual effort.9 9 The German Copyright Act, as amended,
requires the permission of the author for any reproduction of
the protected program, including the making of back-up cop-
ies. 100 The Act also requires the author's permission for the ex-
ploitation and publication of a protected work.' 0 ' The situation
regarding reverse engineering is not explicitly addressed. How-
ever, the statute may be read to require the right-holder's per-
mission to reverse engineer. 0 2
German courts, with the notable exception of the Federal
Tax Court, have generally accepted the supremacy of EC law. 0 3
94. Copyright Act of 1965, § 2(1) (F.R.G.), translated in BUSINESS TRANSAc.
TIONS IN GERMANY app. 18-2 (Bernd Riister ed., 1993) [hereinafter German Act].
95. See Warnot, supra note 8, at 364.
96. Judgment of May 9, 1985 (Suedwestdeutsche Inkasso KG v. Bappart
Burker Computer GmBH), Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivil-
sachen, [BGHZ] (F.R.G.), translated in 17 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
681 (1986).
97. Id. at 687-88.
98. See Warnot, supra note 8, at 364.
99. Id. at 364-65.
100. German Act, supra note 94, §§ 15(1), 16.
101. Id. § 15.
102. CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 88, at 22-24.
103. See KENT, supra note 4, at 48. In one particular case the Tax court
adopted a rule contrary to the earlier decision by the ECJ in the same case. Id.
An appeal to the Bundesgerichtshof resulted in a reversal. Id.
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In order to conform to the Directive, originality requirements of
German copyright law need to be lowered, and explicit al-
lowances for reverse engineering need to be added to the Ger-
man Act.10 4
C. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has recently adopted the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act of 1988.105 The Act includes computer
programs as literary works to be protected by copyright. 10 6
Originality requirements are not explicitly defined within the
Act. However, case law on point has set the originality stan-
dard at a low level. 10 7 The Act applies the author's control over
copying to the whole or any substantial part of the work, re-
gardless of whether copying occurs directly or indirectly. 08 The
Act defines copying as reproducing the work in any material
form, including storing the work in any medium by electronic
means and making intermediate copies that are incidental to
some other use of the work. 10 9 Thus, without the permission of
the author, the normal use of a computer program, which en-
tails some loading of the code into the memory of the computer,
is restricted. The Act does not provide exceptions for the mak-
ing of back-up copies, and would certainly disallow reverse engi-
neering, including decompilation." 0 In addition to complete
control over reproduction, the Act provides the author with ex-
tensive control over authorizing adaptations to the program."'
The fair dealing provision of the Act provides that copying of
104. CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 88, at 23-24.
105. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48 (Eng.), reprinted in
GERALD DWORKIN & RICHARD D. TAYLOR, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT,
DESIGNS & PATENTS ACT 1988, at 211 (1989) [hereinafter U.K. Act].
106. Id. § 3(1)(b), at 223.
107. See, e.g., Interlego A.G. v. Tyco Indus. Inc., [1989] 1 App. Cas. 217 (P.C.
1988) (appeal taken from H.K.). The court held that copyright law will protect
anything which is an independent product of the author, which involves the expen-
diture of some skill, labor, or experience, and which is not a slavish copy of another
work, with no significant additional features. See id. at 256-59.
108. ROBERT MERKIN, COPYRIGHT, DESIGNS AND PATENTS: THE NEW LAw
§ 14.10-14.17 (1989).
109. U.K. Act, supra note 105, § 17(1), (6), at 229.
110. See MERKIN, supra note 108, § 14.15-14.16.
111. U.K. Act, supra note 105, § 21, at 230-31. The Act explains that "[iln
relation to a computer program a 'translation' includes a version of the program in




literary works for the purposes of research or private study,
criticism, or review, or reporting a current event does not con-
stitute infringement, provided that sufficient acknowledgment
of the work is included. 112 As such, it is unlikely that reverse
engineering for the commercial exploitation of a computer pro-
gram would be permitted under the fair dealing provision.
The courts of the United Kingdom have moved from reli-
ance on national legislation over EC Law, to general acceptance
of the supremacy of EC law, as evinced by both the Court of
Appeal and the House of Lords. 113 A recent decision by the ECJ
in a case referred to it by the Queen's Bench Divisional Court
holds that national laws which challenge relevant EC law may
be temporarily suspended, and interim relief granted under EC
law." 4 The U.K. faces some challenges in harmonizing its do-
mestic law with the terms of the Directive. 115 The Act would
have to be drastically modified to permit the copying and trans-
lation necessary for decompilation. 16 Legislative amendments
will be necessary to bring about this level of conformity.1 7
D. Spain
Spain has recently adopted a new law that labels computer
programs as protected works and extends protection to source
code and object code, as well as accessory documentation such
as user manuals. 18 The Spanish law calls for absolute freedom
between parties in agreeing to the conditions upon which rights
computer language or code, otherwise than incidentally in the course of running
the program." Id. § 21(4), at 231.
112. Id. §§ 29-30, at 233-34.
113. See KENT, supra note 4, at 42-45. The House of Lords has applied a "rule
of construction" approach to reconcile EC and UK legislation, loosely interpreting
UK legislation so it will comport with relevant EC law. Id. at 43. If the UK legis-
lation directly contravenes the EC law, the House of Lords can follow the domestic
law; however, this scenario is rather unlikely. Id. at 44. Where the EC law is not
directly effective, a compromise position is advocated, which involves interpreting
the UK law 'purposively' to comply with the spirit and purpose of the relevant EC
law. Id.; see supra note 80 and accompanying text for a discussion of direct effect.
114. See KENT, supra note 4, at 45.
115. CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 88, at 31-32.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Copyright Act of 1987, arts. 10(1)(i), 96(1), 96(2) (Sp.), translated in U.N.
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to a computer program will be transferred. 119 Although reverse
engineering is not mentioned in the legislation, the Spanish law
closely follows the trends underlying the Directive regarding re-
production and adaptation. 120 Thus, although provisions re-
garding reverse engineering must be added to the law, the task
of harmonizing Spanish law with the Directive should not prove
as burdensome as that of its sister states.
The member states face a task of varying difficulty in at-
tempting to harmonize their domestic laws with the Directive.
Ironically, the states with the most developed software protec-
tion laws face the most arduous task in achieving conformance.
This dichotomous result may have implications for the practi-
cality of the Directive, as these states have developed their
software laws based on years of experience with the software
industry.
IV. Multinational Conventions
Desire to achieve uniformity among the rights conferred
under copyright law was the impetus that lead to the drafting of
multinational conventions on copyright. 121 Early bilateral trea-
ties proved unsatisfactory in this regard as they created a
patchwork of differing relationships between states. 122 Cur-
rently, several multinational copyright conventions are in force.
The most prevalent of these is the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne Convention"
or "Convention").1 23 Enacted in 1886, the Berne Convention
119. CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 88, at 27-29.
120. Id.
121. See STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOUR-
ING RIGHTS 33-35 (2d ed. 1989). Stewart explains this impetus by way of a 'home-
made product tax' analogy. Id. at 35. If a work produced in country A were to be
protected by copyright in country A but not in country B or C, so that it could be
freely reproduced in those countries, it could be imported into country A where it
would compete with products that have paid for the copyright permission. Id. As
the imported products will not have had to pay for copyright permission, they will
be cheaper and ultimately drive the home-made products out of the market. Id.
The effect is as though a tariff had been imposed on domestic products, with no
corresponding mark-up on imports. The greater the mobility of the goods the more
serious the problem becomes. Id.
122. Id. at 36.
123. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, June
26, 1948, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), 331 U.N.T.S. 217
[hereinafter Berne Convention]; see also STEWART, supra note 121, at 36-37.
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promotes "national treatment" of copyright laws.124 Thus, the
right-holder is entitled to the copyright protection afforded such
works in the country in which the work is being marketed, pro-
vided such laws comport with the parameters of the Conven-
tion.125 An additional benefit of the Berne Convention, absent
in other conventions, is that it automatically provides protec-
tion in other Berne states through membership in the Berne
Union, without the attendant formalities of the particular mar-
keting state. 126 Although the Berne Convention does not specif-
ically list computer programs among the examples of
copyrightable works, it is well accepted that computer programs
are afforded protection under the Convention as literary
works.127
Under the Berne Convention, protection is to be afforded to
published as well as unpublished works. 128 Authors are granted
the exclusive right to make and authorize translations of their
works.129 Authors are also granted exclusive control over the
reproduction of their works with the exception of certain limited
allowances for reproduction by the press.130 Article 10 details a
fair practice provision, allowing limited unauthorized reproduc-
tions of parts of a work, which have been made available to the
124. Warnot, supra note 8, at 361-62; see also STEWART, supra note 121, at 37.
125. STEWART, supra note 121, at 37-41. The success of the Berne Convention
is due in large part to this use of national treatment. Id. at 36-37. Many of the Pan
American conventions that were concurrent with the Berne Convention can attri-
bute their failure to the adoption of the principle of lex fori, or the adoption of the
laws of the country of the work's origin. Id. at 37. This impractical measure had
courts in country A attempting to apply the laws of country B and C in copyright
suits involving products created in those states. Id. Additionally, this scheme did
not provide opportunities for nationals living in countries with weak copyright pro-
tection to experience the healthier protection of other states, and consequently
lobby their own governments to improve the level of protection. Id. at 38.
126. Berne Convention, supra note 123, art. 4(2), S. TREATY Doc. No. 27,
supra note 123, at 3, 331 U.N.T.S. at 223.
127. See Warnot, supra note 8, at 362. The fact that computer programs are
not included among the examples listed in the Berne Convention is understanda-
ble when one considers that the industry was in its infancy in 1971 when the
Berne Convention was last amended. Id.
128. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, June
26, 1948, art. 3(1)(a), reprinted in STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPY-
RIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 909, 910 (2d ed. 1989).
129. Berne Convention, supra note 123, art. 8, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, supra
note 123, at 7, 331 U.N.T.S. at 229.
130. Id. art. 9, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, supra note 123, at 7, 331 U.N.T.S. at
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public for educational or newsworthy purposes.13' The Berne
Convention also grants control to authors over any adaptations,
arrangements, and other alterations of the work.132
A. Potential Conflicts with the Directive
EC law is directly effective, and directly applicable.133 In-
ternational copyright conventions such as the Berne Conven-
tion, on the other hand, "merely oblige contracting states to
bring their national legislation into conformity with convention
law."13 4 Where a contracting state fails to conform, the only
remedy is an appeal by the injured state to the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ"). 135 Individual citizens of these con-
tracting states have no remedy under the conventions on their
own.
136
Due to the Berne Convention's adherence to "national
treatment", the effect of the Convention laws in a particular
state is dependent upon the national laws of that state.137 Con-
vention provisions are incorporated into (and form part of) the
law of the state, to the extent allowed under its national law. 38
This approach contrasts with EC law, which is not international
law in the generally accepted sense, but is supranational (and
thus sui generis) in nature as it endeavors to approximate the
laws of the member states. 39
Conflicts are inevitable between convention law and EC
law. While convention laws are to be incorporated into the laws
of the member states, EC laws attempt to harmonize the law
131. Id. art. 10, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, supra note 123, at 7, 331 U.N.T.S. at
230-31.
132. Id. art. 12, S. TaREATY Doc. No. 27, supra note 123, at 9, 331 U.N.T.S. at
233.
133. See KENT, supra note 4, at 27. Directly applicable laws confer rights and
obligations on the governments (and in some cases the individuals) of a member
state, which may be enforced in the national courts. Id.; see also supra note 80 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the direct effect of EC law on the member
states.









among the member states. 140 EC law cannot free the member
states from obligations arising under international conventions,
and cannot possibly account for all of the obligations of one or
more member states under such conventions.' 4' Conflicts be-
tween these two laws would be adjudicated before the ECJ,
which has not yet faced this type of issue. 142 However, it is not
within the jurisdiction of the ECJ to adjudicate points of Con-
vention law.143 Such conflicts could only be resolved by deciding
whether or not a provision of Convention law should be recog-
nized and applied within the EC.'" The ECJ may refuse to ap-
ply a Convention law only if its provisions conflict with EC
law. 145
In the introduction and throughout the body of the Direc-
tive, the Council purports to adhere to, and conform with, the
Berne Convention. 146 A close reading of the Directive, however,
reveals several potential areas of conflict between the two laws.
The Berne Convention grants the author control over any trans-
lation of his work, 147 whereas Article 5 of the Directive allows
for unauthorized translations, and Article 6, insofar as decompi-
lation requires translation, condones this unauthorized act as
well. 48 Unauthorized reproductions are limited under the
Berne Convention to uses that comport with fair practice (ie.
uses that benefit the public such as news reporting, education,
etc. . .).149 The Directive permits reproduction as a step in the
reverse engineering of a program. 50 As the motive behind this
reproduction is often the commercial exploitation of a compet-
ing program, it would seem to conflict with the "public benefit"
exceptions enumerated in the Berne Convention.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 561-62.




146. See Directive, supra note 5, at 43-45.
147. See Berne Convention, supra note 123, art. 8, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27,
supra note 123, at 7, 331 U.N.T.S. at 229.
148. See Directive, supra note 5, arts. 5-6, at 44-45.
149. See Berne Convention, supra note 123, arts. 10 -10bis
, S. TREATY Doc. No.
27, supra note 123, at 7-8, 331 U.N.T.S. at 230-31.
150. See Directive, supra note 5, arts. 5-6 at 44-45.
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Conflicts between the Berne Convention and the Directive
present problems for the states. It remains to be seen whether
conformity between these authorities can be achieved without
resort to the courts. If this is not accomplished, the ECJ may
refuse to recognize conflicting portions of the Berne Convention
that cannot be reconciled with the Directive.
V. United States Law
A. General Application of Copyright Law to Software
1. Legislation
Due to its pioneering role in the software industry, the gov-
ernment of the United States was faced with the complexities
inherent in drafting legislation to protect software before the
governments of the member states. 151 In 1978, the Commission
On New Technological Uses Of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU")
finalized its report to Congress, making the United States the
first nation that sought to explicitly include computer programs
among the works to which copyright protection should apply. 152
This report resulted in the 1980 amendments to the United
States Copyright Act of 1976 ("U.S. Act"). 153 These amend-
ments preceded the addition of computer programs to the copy-
right laws of the EC member states, and were a model from
which they could draft their software copyright laws.
The U.S. Act gives authors the exclusive right to reproduce
and distribute software. 54 This act also gives authors the right
to create and authorize derivative works, as well as the right to
authorize all translations and adaptations of their work. 55 The
Directive, while granting the right to control adaptations and
151. See Palmer & Vinje, supra note 7, at 66.
152. See generally U.S. NAT'L COMM. ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COi'y-
RIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOG-
ICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1979). The CONTU report recommended that
17 U.S.C. § 101 be amended to include computer programs in the definition of
copyrightable works, that rightful owners of a program should be able to adapt the
program to their uses, and that 17 U.S.C. § 117 should be modified to allow all
copying that occurs incidental to the normal use of copyrighted programs. Id. at 1.
153. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-117 (1988).
154. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (detailing exclusive rights conferred to authors of
copyrighted works).
155. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988). Derivative works are defined as those works




translations, does not grant exclusive control of derivative
works to the author.156 The 1980 amendments to the U.S. Act
create two narrow exceptions to the author's exclusive repro-
duction right.157 The first exception provides that users are free
to make back-up copies of computer programs and copies that
are an essential step in the utilization of the program.158 The
second exception, known as the fair use exception, is similar to
the fair practice exceptions in the Berne Convention as it ex-
empts normally unauthorized acts such as reproduction, if the
use is deemed fair. 59 The U.S. Act lists examples of fair uses as
those for the purpose of criticism, commentary, newspaper re-
porting, or teaching. 60 It then provides a test to be applied on a
case by case basis to determine if a particular use will be consid-
ered fair.'6 ' The fair use test is an equitable inquiry that bal-
ances the rights of authors against concerns such as the public
benefit, in determining which reproductions should be ex-
empted from copyright protection. 162 Section 107 of the U.S. Act
lists factors to be considered in determining whether a particu-
lar use is fair. 63 These factors include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use; including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the market for, or the value of the
copyrighted work.16 4
densation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed or
adapted." Id. § 101.
156. See Directive, supra note 5, arts. 4-6, at 44-45. Programs created via
decompilation are not controlled by the author and would, in many instances, con-
stitute a derivative work. Id. art. 6, at 45.
157. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 117 (1988).
158. Id. § 117.
159. See id. § 107; see also Berne Convention, supra note 123, art. 10, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 27, supra note 123, at 7, 331 U.N.T.S. at 229-31.
160. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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2. Case Law
The courts have used the standard of substantial similarity
as a step in determining whether a work has been copied. 165 If
there is no evidence that an alleged infringer had access to the
original work, the similarities between the two works must be
so striking as to preclude the possibility of independent deriva-
tion by the defendant.' 66 To perform such a substantial similar-
ity analysis, courts have adopted the "abstractions test", first
espoused by Judge Learned Hand in the case of Nichols v. Uni-
versal Pictures Corp.,167 in which two plays involving star-
crossed lovers were scrutinized for their similarities. 6 8 Judge
Hand explained that such a task involved the determination of
the level of abstraction in expressing the idea, beyond which
copyright protection will not extend:
Upon any work a great number of patterns of increasing general-
ity will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left
out. The last may be perhaps no more than the most general
statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist
only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions
where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the play-
wright could prevent the use of his "ideas", to which, apart from
their expression, his property is never extended. 169
This concept is best explained via a simple example: Sup-
pose we were analyzing two portraits. At the lowest level of ab-
straction, we could say that these two objects are very different
(i.e. different canvas material, paint composition, brush strokes,
etc.). As we proceed to a higher level of abstraction we may an-
alyze the subject matter of the paintings, and once again may
determine that they are different (i.e. they are portraits of dif-
ferent people). But as we progress toward higher levels of ab-
straction, (i.e. as more detail is excluded) it is obvious that
differences in the two works will become less apparent (i.e. they
are both portraits, both paintings, both works of visual art,
etc.). The abstractions test begins at the lowest level of abstrac-
tion, and progresses upward, leaving more and more detail out
165. See See v. Durang, 771 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1983).
166. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
167. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
168. Id.




as it goes. The definitive evaluation of substantial similarity
turns on the choice of the proper level of abstraction in deter-
mining "the line between expression and what is expressed." 70
The application of the U.S. Act to computer software has
been the subject of intense and continuing court battles.' 7 The
proper separation of idea from expression, a difficult task in any
copyright action, is further complicated when the work is of a
functional nature such as a computer program. 72
Modern treatment of the idea expression distinction in
functional works derives from the Supreme Court's holding in
the case of Baker v. Selden.173 In that case, the plaintiff had
written a book describing a bookkeeping system and had in-
cluded sample ledger sheets that would allow one to practice
the described system. 74 The defendant later published a book
containing ledger sheets that were substantially similar to
those of the plaintiff.175 In the copyright infringement action
that followed, the Court stated that although Selden's descrip-
tion of the bookkeeping system was protected, the system itself
was not.176
This holding was the foundation for what is now 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b). 77 The application of § 102(b) to computer programs
holds that while the creative expression adopted by the
programmer is rightfully protected by copyright law, protection
is not available for the processes or methods embodied within
170. Id. Judge Hand suggested that this is to be done on a case by case basis:
"Nobody has been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." Id.
171. See, e.g., Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc.,
807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033
(1984).
172. Peter A. Wald et al., Standards for Interoperability and the Copyright
Protection of Computer Programs, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY/ANTITRUST 701 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series
No. 339, 1992).
173. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
174. Id. at 100.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 102. "Such a book may be explanatory either of old systems, or of
an entirely new system; and, considered as a book, as the work of an author...
[b]ut there is a clear distinction between the book, as such, and the art which it is
intended to illustrate." Id.
177. Wald, supra note 172, at 709.
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the program.178 The protection of such processes and methods
is the proper scope of the patent laws.17 9
This analysis reveals the difficulties encountered in deter-
mining what portion of a computer program is expressive and
what is an idea. A substantial body of case law has developed
concerning how far copyright protection should extend beyond
literal computer code.180 Protection of non-literal elements in
computer programs has been sought for intangible concepts
such as the "look and feel" of the program, or its output display,
or the "structure, sequence and organization" of the program.181
In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc.,182 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that a program, although not a precise reproduction or
translation, was an infringement because it was an exact copy
of the structure of the original program. 8 3 The court reasoned
that since derivative works and compilations were granted
copyright protection under U.S. copyright law, the structure
and organization of a literary work could be part of it's expres-
sion protected by copyright.l 4 In Whelan, the defendant had
created a personal computer-based program to manage a dental
laboratory, by translating the plaintiffs mainframe-based
"Dentalab" program. 18 5 Although the defendant had clearly de-
rived his code from the plaintiffs program, there was no literal
copying per se, due to the fact that the defendant's code was
written in a different language. 186 In this case, the court ex-
tended copyright protection beyond the literal code to the non-
literal elements of a program which included the "structure, se-
178. Id. at 710 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670).
179. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-101 (1988). The unprotected method in Baker v. Selden
was the plaintiffs "system of accounting". See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104
(1879).
180. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1992); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
181. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248.
182. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
183. See id. at 1224-27.
184. Id. at 1239.





quence, and organization" of the program.18 7 The court defined
the sole idea underlying the program as the efficient manage-
ment of a dental laboratory, thus, any other aspect of the pro-
gram was presumed to be expressive.""'
The Whelan decision quickly prompted criticism. In Com-
puter Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,8 9 it was ar-
gued that the Whelan decision was flawed in its assumption
that only one idea underlies any computer program, and that
once this separable idea is identified, everything else must be
expression. 90 The Computer Associates court viewed the ulti-
mate function or purpose of a computer program as the com-
bined result of interacting subroutines. 91 Since each of these
subroutines can individually be viewed as a program, each may
be thought to have its own "idea".9 2 Thus, Whelan's "one pro-
gram-one idea" theory was found descriptively inadequate. 193
The court detailed a three-step test, based on the abstractions
theory advanced by Judge Hand, which was to be used to deter-
mine whether the non-literal elements of two or more computer
programs were substantially similar. 94 The three step test,
which is widely accepted as the current law in software copy-
right actions, was labelled the "abstraction-filtration-compari-
son" test. 9 5 The first step, "abstraction", involves the same
analysis described by Judge Hand in the Nichols case. 196 The
court is to dissect the alleged infringer's code, isolating each
level of abstraction, beginning with the code itself, and ending
"with an articulation of the program's ultimate function." 97
The next step, "filtration", involves the examination of "the [pro-
gram's] structural components at each level of abstraction to de-
187. Id. at 1248.
188. Id. at 1238-40. "Because there are a variety of program structures
through which that idea can be expressed, the structure is not a necessary incident
to that idea." Id. at 1240.
189. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
190. Id. at 705 (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON




194. Id. at 706.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 706-07.
197. Id. at 707.
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termine whether their particular inclusion.., was dictated by
considerations of efficiency ... required by factors external to
the program itself; or taken from the public domain and [are]
hence unprotectable." 198 In the third and final step, "compari-
son", the court has filtered out all of the non-protected elements
including ideas, elements dictated by efficiency or external fac-
tors, and elements taken from the public domain, and is left
with a nucleus of protected expression. 199 It is this "golden nug-
get" of expression that the court must then compare to the origi-
nal work in deciding whether the defendant copied any of this
protected expression.2°°
The court acknowledged that this test was, at best, a guide-
line for determining copyright protection for non-literal pro-
gram elements.20 1 It questioned the efficacy of the Copyright
Act to prevent public access to a program's source and object
codes. 202 It observed that while copyright adequately protects
traditional literary works, computer programs are more of a hy-
brid work, as they are at the same time writings and functional
components in the larger process of computing.203 Finally, the
court suggested that the legislative resolution of an issue such
as this may necessitate a CONTU II.204
B. Copyright Law & Reverse Engineering
The U.S. Act does not take a definitive stand on reverse en-
gineering of copyrighted material, as it has no equivalent to
either Article 5 or Article 6 of the Directive. 20 5 It has been ar-
gued that the author's control over derivative works precludes
the allowance of reverse engineering. 20 6 Since there is no ex-
plicit legislation on point, this issue has been largely the prov-
ince of the courts, which have differed in their resolution of the
198. Id.
199. Id. at 710.
200. Id.




205. See Weichselbaum, supra note 9, at 1053; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 117
(1988) (excluding a reverse engineering exception for the author's exclusive rights
in copyrighted works); Directive, supra note 5, arts. 5-6, at 44-45.




question. 20 7 In early cases involving reverse engineering of
computer software, the courts tended to avoid directly address-
ing the issue.208
In Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management Assistance,
Inc., the United States District Court of Idaho enjoined the
plaintiff from developing code that enhanced the defendant's
product via a process that involved both creating a printout of
the defendant's code and copying the defendant's microcode in-
side the computer. 209 The court's decision was premised on the
fact that object code was subject to copyright protection under
the U.S. Act, and thus, the activities of the plaintiff constituted
a possible infringement.210 In dicta, the court reasoned that if
Hubco had deciphered the code through reverse engineering, it
would still have constituted an infringement. 2"
1. The Sega Standard
Recently, in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America21 2
and Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,213 two federal
courts have been directly confronted with cases that have called
for a determination of the legality of reverse engineering of com-
puter programs. 21 4 These two cases presented similar factual
backgrounds. Both cases involved a dispute between a video
game console manufacturer (the plaintiffs), and a video game
cartridge manufacturer (the defendants). 2 5 The dispute in-
volved the plaintiffs' maintenance of a software "lock" mecha-
nism in their game consoles that only permitted game
207. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.
1988); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
208. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988);
Hubco Data Prod. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450
(D. Idaho 1983) (holdings in both cases did not reach the compilation issue).
209. Hubco Data Prods., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 455-58.
210. See Hubco Data Prods., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450, 452 (1983). Hubco's
"Nilsson Method II" increased the capability of MAI's operating system software
by printing out the data structures of the MAI operating system, enabling Hubco
to remove system "governors" inserted by MAI, and thereby increase the systems
performance. Id.
211. Id.
212. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
213. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
214. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993);
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cartridges that contained the proper software "key" mechanism
to function. 216 In this manner, the console manufacturers hoped
to control access to their game consoles, thereby forcing game
cartridge manufacturers to sign licensing arrangements to gain
compatibility between their cartridges and the consoles. 217 Both
console manufacturers also developed and sold their own game
cartridges for use in their consoles, and thus, were active com-
petitors with the defendants. 21 8 In both cases the defendants
did not find the licensing arrangements to their satisfaction,
and decided to develop their own software "key" mechanism. 21 9
As an intermediate step in creating their own compatible car-
tridges, both defendants decompiled the plaintiffs' object codes
(which they obtained by purchasing the plaintiffs' game car-
tridges) to discern the function of the "key" mechanism. 220
Although the Sega court found for the defendant,221 and the
Nintendo court for the plaintiff,222 the decision in the Nintendo
case was a product of the defendant's commission of a fraud
upon the Copyright Office, and did not turn on the resolution of
the reverse engineering question. 223 Both courts found an al-
lowance under the copyright law for the decompilation of object
code, however, the Sega case contained a much more detailed
explanation of the court's reasoning. 224
In the Sega case, the court typified the question of the le-
gality of decompilation of computer programs as one of first im-
pression.225 In this case, the defendant, Accolade, used a two-
step approach to gain compatibility with the Sega console
(called Genesis). 226 First, Accolade obtained copies of three of
Sega's video cartridges, and a Genesis console, and wired the
console to a decompiler, which generated printouts of the source
216. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515; Nintendo, 975 F.2d at 836.
217. See id.
218. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514; Nintendo, 975 F.2d at 835.
219. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514-15; Nintendo, 975 F.2d at 836.
220. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515; Nintendo, 975 F.2d at 836.
221. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1532.
222. Nintendo, 975 F.2d at 847.
223. Id.
224. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1513 n.1 (explaining that the analysis and conclu-
sions in the case are consistent with those in the Nintendo case).
225. Id. at 1513-14.




code on the cartridges. 227 Accolade engineers then studied these
printouts looking for "areas of commonality" among them.228
Through such experimentation, the engineers at Accolade were
able to create a development manual detailing the require-
ments for creating a Genesis-compatible game.229 Next, Acco-
lade engineers utilized this design manual to create Genesis
compatible cartridges. 230
In the meantime, Sega had licensed with another software
company to use its patented Trademark Security System
("TMSS") software in the Genesis. 231 The TMSS software con-
tained an initialization sequence that required the inclusion of
the letters "S-E-G-A" at a particular memory location on the
cartridge as a criterion for compatibility with the console. 232 Ac-
colade discovered that its cartridges did not work on these new
Genesis consoles and sought to reestablish compatibility.233
Eventually, Accolade learned of the "S-E-G-A" requirement, and
added this requirement to its design manual, and, shortly
thereafter, Accolade once again commenced releasing Genesis-
compatible games. 234
Sega filed suit in the district court claiming inter alia, that
Accolade infringed its copyright on its game cartridges. 23 5 In
granting Sega's motion for a preliminary injunction, the district
court rejected Accolade's argument that intermediate copying of
copyrighted code does not constitute infringement. 23 6 Acco-
lade's appeal from that injunction was what prompted the cir-
cuit court's consideration. 23 7
Accolade presented four arguments to support its conten-
tion that its decompilation did not amount to a copyright in-
227. Id. at 1514-15.
228. Id. at 1515.
229. Id. Accolade claimed that this manual contained only "functional descrip-
tions" of Sega's code and did not contain the literal code. Id.
230. Id. Thus, Accolade maintained that it did not copy Sega's programs but
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fringement. 2 8 First, it argued that intermediate copying does
not infringe on the author's exclusive rights, "unless the end
product... is substantially similar to the copyrighted work."239
Second, it maintained that decompilation is permitted under 17
U.S.C. § 102(b), if it is preformed to gain an "understanding of
the ideas and functional concepts embodied in the code."240
Third, it claimed that decompilation is allowed under 17 U.S.C.
§ 117, which allows a lawful owner of a copy of a computer pro-
gram to load it into the computer's memory. 241 Finally, it con-
tended "that disassembly of object code to gain an
understanding of the ideas and functional concepts embodied in
the code is a fair use that is privileged by section 107 of the
Act. 24 2
The court dispensed with Accolade's first three arguments
as being at odds with the U.S. Act and relevant case law.243 It
found that intermediate copying was a violation of the author's
exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106, regardless of whether
the end product of the copying also infringed those rights.244
The court conceded that there has been some scholarly author-
ity for Accolade's assertion that object code should only receive
"thin" copyright protection, as it is not readily human-readable,
and is thus unlike other literary works for which the protection
applies. 245 However, the court, disagreed with this contention,
pointing to 17 U.S.C. § 102, which includes protection for works
"which can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."246





242. Id. at 1518.
243. Id. "Neither the language of the Act nor the law of this circuit supports
Accolade's first three arguments." Id.
244. Id. The court found that although the "allegedly infringing copy of a pro-
tected work may itself be only an inchoate representation of some final product to
be marketed commercially [this] does not in itself negate the possibility of infringe-
ment." Id. (quoting Walker v. University Books, 602 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1979)).
245. Id. at 1519. An example of this authority can be found in Brief Amicus
Curiae of Eleven Copyright Law Professors, Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 92-15655), reprinted in 33 JURIMETRICS J. 147
(1992).




that Accolade's use was beyond the intended scope of the § 117
allowance. 247
The court finally addressed Accolade's contention that its
decompilation was a fair use permitted by § 107.248 Accolade ar-
gued that decompilation was the only means available in this
situation to gain access to the unprotected elements in the pro-
gram, and that it had a legitimate interest in gaining such ac-
cess (i.e. the creation of Genesis-compatible cartridges). 249 The
court agreed with this argument and created a decompilation
exception to copyright protection of computer programs under
the fair use doctrine. 250 The exception applies where there is a
legitimate reason for examining the unprotected elements of
the code and decompilation is the only available means of gain-
ing such access to the code.251
The court arrived at this decision by weighing the four stat-
utory factors delineating fair use under § 107.252 With respect
to the first factor, the nature of the use, the court dispensed
with Sega's assertion that since the copying was done to pro-
duce a competing product, it was a commercial use, not entitled
to fair use protection.253 The court found that the use was an
intermediate step in the production of a commercial work, thus
the commercial exploitation was indirect.25 4 It decided that
although Accolade's ultimate purpose was the creation of Gene-
sis-compatible games, its direct purpose, and thus its direct use
of the material, was merely to understand the functional re-
quirements for compatibility. 255 The court concluded that Acco-
lade's use of Sega's code was for a legitimate purpose consistent
with the fair use requirements and held that the presumption of
unfairness incident to commercial use had been overcome. 25 6
247. Id. at 1520.
248. Id. at 1520-28.
249. Id. at 1520.
250. Id. at 1527-28.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1521-27.
253. Id. at 1522. The court characterized Sega's analysis as overly simplistic
in that it ignored other aspects of the "purpose and character of the use." Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1522-23.
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The second statutory factor, the nature of the copyrighted
work, prompted the court to discuss the "hybrid nature" of com-
puter programs as literary and utilitarian works.257 The court
acknowledged the fact that object code is unlike traditional lit-
erary works as it is not directly human-readable. 258 The court
further opined that, apart from decompilation, no other viable
alternative existed for gaining access to the unprotected ele-
ments in Sega's code. 259 It pointed out that in such circum-
stances, the determination that decompilation was a per se
unfair use, would be tantamount to granting a monopoly over
the ideas embodied within the code, ideas that were statutorily
denied copyright protection. 260 Thus, upon finding that Sega's
code contained unprotected elements to which access could not
be had without copying, it was afforded a lower level of protec-
tion than traditional literary works.261 The court concluded
that the nature of the work factor weighed in favor of Accolade's
use.
2 62
The third factor was the amount copied in relation to the
work as a whole.26 3 Here the court found that Accolade's decom-
pilation necessarily involved the copying of the entirety of
Sega's code. 264 Thus, this factor weighed in Sega's favor.265 The
court, however, asserted that this factor, by itself, was not de-
terminative of the fair use question. 26 6 The court explained that
in cases where the use was not directly commercial, this factor
was to be accorded very little weight.267
257. Id. at 1524-25.
258. Id. at 1525. The court dispensed with Sega's contention that trained
software engineers can, in fact, read object code, but that it is a tedious task. "Be-
cause even a trained programmer cannot possibly remember the millions of zeros
and ones that make up a program. . . he must make a written or computerized
copy of the disassembled code in order to keep track of his work." Thus, in the
translation of object to source code copies must be made. Id.












The court then looked at the fourth statutory factor, the "ef-
fect on the potential market for the copyrighted work."268 The
court found that Accolade did not intend to preempt Sega from
releasing a particular game into the market. 269 Rather, the
court found that Accolade only sought to become a "legitimate
competitor in the field of Genesis-compatible video games."270
The court held that Accolade's entrance into the market of Gen-
esis-compatible cartridge producers had an indirect effect on
Sega's video game market.271 There was no reason to believe,
for example, that a purchaser of Accolade's "Ishido" cartridge
would be dissuaded from buying Sega's "Altered Beast" car-
tridge.272 Thus, the court found that the fourth statutory factor
weighed in favor of Accolade. 273
Accordingly, the court found that as the first, second, and
fourth statutory factors weighed in favor of Accolade, it was
likely to prevail on its fair use defense, and the preliminary in-
junction was unwarranted. 274 This holding, which must be con-
sidered the current law of the United States regarding
decompilation, does not square with the traditional context of
copyright law, at least to the extent that it permits the "whole-
sale copying" of the plaintiffs work for a commercial purpose.275
The court explains this apparent discrepancy by pointing out
that this is "a complex and relatively unexplored area of copy-
right law", and that its decision is in keeping with the policy
considerations underlying the copyright law. 276
The court dismissed an argument advanced by the plaintiff
contending that much time and money went into the prepara-
tion of the Genesis system and its game cartridges, and that the
court's holding would allow Accolade to be a "free rider" on the
plaintiffs laborious product development. 277 The court pointed
to the holding in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Ser-





273. Id. at 1524.
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vice Co. 278 which stated that "sweat of the brow" is not protected
under the U.S. Act.279 However, the work involved when pre-
paring a phone book, as was the case in Feist, is arguably less
creative than the development of computer software. If the
copyright laws will not protect Sega's effort, then it may be ar-
gued that a fundamental purpose thereof, that of the promotion
of the publication of ideas, is being frustrated. This decision
may be construed as discouraging investments of time and
money into the production of innovative software. In light of
the importance of the industry and its rapid growth, this factor
is deserving of serious consideration.
It is interesting to note that while both the Directive and
the Sega decision would permit decompilation of object code
under certain circumstances, neither is able to articulate with
any degree of certainty what these circumstances are. Software
developers are not given clear guidance on when their works
are to be protected, or when their acts will constitute copying.
Attorneys must grapple with these vague standards in attempt-
ing to advise their clients, and the courts, with such minimal
guidance, are likely to arrive at inconsistent holdings, further
complicating an area of law that is already wanting in clarity.
VI. Analysis: The Software Industry in the Wake of
the Directive
The Directive was the EC's attempt to find a middle ground
between the conflicting interests within the software indus-
try.280 It was hoped that a limited exception to the author's ex-
clusive rights to allow for interoperability would balance the
larger manufacturers' concerns about piracy with the smaller
developers' fears over the bolstering of monopolistic proprietary
systems.28' As drafted, the Directive is certainly the most ambi-
tious legislation to date in the area of software protection, and
the first that has directly addressed the decompilation issue.
The impact that the Directive will have on the industry remains
to be seen. However, it is inevitable that the Directive will cre-
278. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
279. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527 (citing Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 351-61).
280. See supra part II for a discussion of the reverse engineering exception,





ate problems as developers seek to enforce their varying inter-
pretations on one another.
One point of contention already being debated is the provi-
sion under Article 6 stating that decompilation is not to be sanc-
tioned unless it is indispensable to achieving interoperability. 28 2
A further provision therein states that the information needed
to achieve interoperability must not have been readily avail-
able.28 3 From this reading, one may assume that if information
is required to achieve interoperability, a request may be di-
rected to the manufacturer. The manufacturer will be unlikely
to refuse such a request. In the first place, most manufacturers
publish extensive system specifications with their products that
contain much of the interface information that would likely be
requested. 28 4 Additionally, the refusal of such a request, under
the Directive, may trigger the user's decompilation rights. 28 5
Most software license agreements provide that information will
be made available at some cost to the requester. 28 6 The Direc-
tive, however, provides no guidance on how this arrangement is
to be managed. For instance, small developers may find the fee
required to obtain the interface information needed for their in-
teroperable design usurious. In such situations, will developers
be able to decompile the licensed program, claiming that the
requisite information was not readily available? This issue may
necessitate the adoption of clarifying legislation in the area of
software licensing.
Additionally, questions arise as to how much information
the developer must provide. 287 Often there are many possible
interfaces to a software application.288 Must the developer pro-
vide all of these? Who will resolve disputes of this nature? The
Directive is unclear on the degree of availability that is required
to preclude the decompilation right from arising in the user.28 9
Thus, in response to the inevitable disputes that will arise over
282. See Directive, supra note 5, art. 6(1), at 45.
283. See Directive, supra note 5, art. 6(1)(b), at 45.
284. See Violent Emotions, supra note 32, at 19.
285. See Hillary Pearson et al., Commercial Implications of the European
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this issue, the states will have to further adapt their copyright
legislation.
Another issue that will undoubtedly require further legisla-
tion is the standard by which the act of decompilation will be
judged. 290 Users will need to seek technical and legal counsel
before deciding to decompile a program in order to understand
the extent of decompilation, if any, that is legally permissible on
a particular program.291 This level of uncertainty is a function
of the open-ended definition for interoperability adopted in the
Directive, and will undoubtedly add significant time and ex-
pense to software development cycles. As this lack of clarity be-
comes an issue in the industry, it will fall to the member states
of the EC to add precision to the interoperability exception.
Some commentators claim that fears over the widespread
use of decompilation as a vehicle for pirating software are base-
less. 292 They point to the expense in technical skill, time and
money that is required to perform decompilation, and the effort
involved in trying to understand the tens (or hundreds) of
thousands of lines of source code that typically result from
decompilation. 293 This argument, however, is weakened consid-
erably by the recent development of computer aided software
engineering ("CASE") tools, which permit the decompiled source
code to be quickly understood and analyzed, by graphically re-
vealing the underlying structure of the decompiled program. 294
Thus, engineers will be able to quickly understand undocu-
mented source code, and identify major components and data
structures, facilitating the reverse engineering process.295 This
new segment of the software industry was born of the necessity
to maintain and adapt existing software applications to the
290. Id. at 21.
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., Johnson-Laird, supra note 34, at 347-48.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., FORTRAN: CADRE Technologies Intros TEAMWORK/FOR-
TRAN REV for Reverse Engineering of Fortran Programs - Runs on SUN Today,
IBM, HP & DEC Q4/91, EDGE, July 22, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library,
NWLTRS File. Most of these tools currently require that the code has already
been converted to source code. They then facilitate quick understanding of the
source code. There are also tools available for converting object code to something
like source code (pseudo-code), but these are dependent on the processor used to





changing needs of the business environment; however, it is
equally useful for those seeking to create a competing prod-
uct. 296 Thus, when one considers the fact that in 1989 esti-
mated profits lost to pirating operations in Germany, France,
the United Kingdom and Spain totalled well over three billion
dollars,297 together with the emergence of a new industry that
will facilitate the efficient reverse analysis of software, it is easy
to see why concern over a decompilation exception is justified.
The ambiguity of the Directive has many industry experts
concerned about the great potential it has to propagate litiga-
tion.298 It has been typified as "a user's nightmare and a law-
yer's dream."299 Many feel that the opportunity for litigation
under the Directive will place small manufacturers at the
mercy of larger companies which can afford the costs of pro-
tracted law suits. 30 0 If this prediction holds true, many of the
ambiguities within the Directive may ultimately be resolved in
favor of the larger manufacturing concerns.
While it remains to be seen how the various ambiguities
within the Directive will be resolved, it is a certainty that the
early stages of its implementation will be fraught with litiga-
tion.301 It is only through the respective state governments' in-
terpretations of the Directive that it will provide the specificity
needed to sustain industry growth. It is highly likely that the
states will turn to the recent holdings of the United States
courts in defining the legal parameters of decompilation. How-
ever, as the Sega holding indicates, United States case law has
yet to lend sufficient clarity to this area of the law. 30 2
296. Id.
297. See Mike Lewis, What Software Copyright Laws Allow; European Com-
munity's Directive on Software Copyright International Report Related to the High
Cost of Software Piracy in Europe, DATA BASED ADVISOR, Mar. 1992, at 130.
298. See EC Directive Angers Software Users; European Community Copy-
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VII. Conclusion
The European Council Directive on the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, which took effect on January 1, 1993, is
the most ambitious legislation to date in the area of software
protection. The purpose of this legislation was to harmonize the
laws of the member states with regard to software protection
and to strike a balance between the competing needs of large
and small developers, including software users. At the same
time, there was an attempt to add specificity to copyright pro-
tection of software that is lacking in national legislation, with-
out exceeding the historical copyright protection .of the Berne
Convention. Such an undertaking is both necessary and lauda-
ble, as this industry promises to continue its healthy growth
and should form a cornerstone of the European Community's
economy.
The member states face challenges in attempting to con-
form their laws to the Directive. There is no state whose laws
currently permit reverse engineering of computer programs.
Moreover, the states' respective provisions regarding reproduc-
tion, translation and adaptation of software will need to be
modified, if conformity is to be achieved. Additionally, as signa-
tories of the Berne Convention, states must either face the task
of interpreting portions of the Directive that are seemingly at
odds with provisions of the Convention, or seek a ruling from
the ECJ on whether portions of the Convention are to remain
valid under EC law. Finally, it will fall upon the states to lend
clarity to the Directive's ambiguous treatment of the definitions
and limitations of the decompilation exception.
There is an inevitable tension that exists when drafting
new legislation. It is desirable to lend sufficient detail to the
law to ensure its utility, while avoiding the creation of iron-clad
rules with no room for growth. This is especially true when the
legislation involves a rapidly evolving area of technology such
as computer software. Thus, the drafters of the Directive faced
the challenges of providing protection for software developers
without ignoring the changing nature of the industry.
The Directive creates exceptions to traditional copyright
law tailored specifically to the protection of computer programs.
However, it provides little detail on the extent or implementa-




practical realities of the current market. This imprecision will
undoubtedly result in much needless litigation.
The Directive will not serve to enhance the growth of the
software industry. Although the EC solicited extensive input
from industry experts in drafting the Directive, it can at best be
labelled a first step toward definitive software protection legis-
lation. Until its imprecision and inconsistencies are removed,
the Directive cannot accomplish the goal of uniform software
protection within the EC, and is likely to create more confusion
than existed prior to its passage. For now, the future of Euro-
pean software protection lies with the governments of the mem-
ber states.
Marc A. Ehrlich*
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